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regional authorities that have higher estimations of the lack of investment and
risk.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In a market economy, mobile investment resources are directed towards
regions that provide better conditions for production, are less risky and
have better infrastructure. In addition, taxation policy may have an es-
sential influence on investment allocation. Among different taxes and tax
exemptions in Russia, the regions determine some business taxes inde-
pendently. Their authorities are interested in proposing attractive condi-
tions for potential investors for different reasons, including the creation
of new jobs and the extension of local sources of taxes. Therefore, re-
gional tax rates and regional exemptions are tools of inter-regional
competition for investment.
The aim of the project is to study empirically the sub-federal tax exemp-
tions and their efficiency for the attraction of investment in Russia. In
contrast with the clear relationships between the initial conditions and
regional economic performance, there is no systematic evidence that
more favourable regional tax regimes have succeeded in attracting in-
vestments and supporting economic growth in Russian regions. Neither
is there agreement about the reasons which stimulate regional authori-
ties to grant tax reliefs and concessions: are they motivated by attract-
ing investment or by corruption and narrow political goals?
The empirical analysis relies on the legislative database "Consultant-
Plus. The regional legislation" covering the determined period and the
regional scope of the panel data. The panel covers 1992–1999 and 72
Russian jurisdictions and local authorities. Of interest are the tax ex-
emptions and guarantees to those investors and enterprises realising in-
vestment projects which are provided in the sub-national investment
laws, the decisions on tax concessions to particular firms, industries and
small businesses on the adoption of development programmes, and the
creation of "special economic zones" in the regions. The characteristics
of the sub-federal legislation are related to the conditions of regional
economic development. The source of data on the latter indices is Go-
skomstat's "Regions of Russia". Information provided by the regional
administrations on investment projects in several Russian regions is also
used.
The empirical estimations show that the influence of the initial conditions
determines a large part of the level of investment activity in the Russian
regions. But, alongside this factor, regional legislation also has an es-
sential effect on regional investments. It turns out that investors are
more sensitive not to the size nor to the period of the granting of tax re-
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liefs, but to the adoption of the investment law itself, which make it pos-
sible for investors to obtain regional administration guarantees. How-
ever, a positive effect of the sub-federal investment legislation is not so
strong as to block the influence of a combination of negative factors:
unfavourable industrial specialisation and an insufficient level of infra-
structure development. Given favourable initial conditions in a region,
the absence of such a law does not imply a loss of its investment at-
tractiveness. Sub-federal legislative initiatives can compensate for some
adverse factors of development, but can not themselves become a sole
source of development.
The analysis of the factors which determine the features of the regional
legal set-ups shows that more active in the adoption of investment leg-
islation happened to be those regional authorities which have higher es-
timations of the lack of investment. Investment laws are considered in
terms of risk reductions and in the creation of more favourable condi-
tions for business. There are differences in the practice of the passing
of investment laws. However, their dissemination has a tendency to in-
crease the level of tax reliefs, as well as their period and flexibility, along
with a growth in the number of regions which have adopted this legisla-
tive initiative.
INTRODUCTION 7
INTRODUCTION
The legislative process in the Russian regions started in 1992. The
clause enabling regions to pass their own legislative acts was included
in the Federal Treaty signed in 1992. Since then, Russian regions have
passed thousands of laws and other documents affecting many spheres
of life.
The fact that regional authorities actively use their economic power to
regulate the investment climate of regions is confirmed in Vizhina
(1998), in which she analyses laws, resolutions and decrees of the leg-
islative and executive regional bodies of 14 jurisdictions between 1995
and 1997. The analysis shows that regional legislative activity, directed
towards an improvement in the investment climate of the regions, is
growing rapidly.
The experience of the adoption at the regional level of laws granting
concessions and guarantees to investors is now widespread. According
to Ekspert's rating (October 19, 1998), in 1998 Russian regions have
markedly increased their legislative activities aimed at attracting invest-
ment. More than half the Russian regions have passed various invest-
ment laws, providing tax exemptions for investors and for enterprises
realising investment projects.
In Kuznestova (1998), a comparative study of two neighbouring re-
gions — Novgorod and Pskov — concludes that regional tax policy has a
determining role in the economic development of the regions. These re-
gions have practically identical natural conditions. Their industrial struc-
tures and production levels prior to the reform were similar, and earlier
investment ratings placed these regions alongside each other. But
Novgorod's authorities have both granted and fixed in law tax reliefs and
guarantees that are both significant and stable for domestic and foreign
investors. And now the Novgorod region has a substantial lead over the
Pskov region on practically every indicator. In 1997, industrial produc-
tion per capita in the Novgorod region was higher than in Pskov by al-
most 100%; investment was higher by 37% (foreign investment was 82
times as big); household income per capita was higher by 31%; tax
revenues in the regional budget were higher by 55%; the level of unem-
ployment was lower by a factor of almost two; firms with foreign capital
produced more than 50% of gross regional product; and firms in the
Novgorod region in 1997 had practically no wage arrears.
SUB-FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTIONS IN RUSSIA8
But, according to Polishchuk (1999), the economic efficiency of regional
legislative initiatives aimed at improving the investment climate of the
Russian regions "has failed to leave a marked impact either on gross in-
vestments in the Russian economy, or on the allocation of investments
across the country." Firstly, because of the high political, institutional
and economic risk overall in the country and the lack of guarantees at
the federal level which can not be compensated for by sub-federal leg-
islation. Secondly, because of the lack of credibility of the regional legal
and regulatory regimes. The lack of co-ordinating constraints of the
federal centre on the regional initiatives, and the insufficient economic
integration of Russian regions, do not stimulate the dissemination of
successful regional experiments (including connected with the setting
up of a more favourable entrepreneurial climate) or produce political in-
centives for regional authorities that favour control over the regional
economies instead of setting impartial rules for economic agents. Under
these conditions, the economic performance of the regions continues to
be largely pre-determined by their natural resources and the industrial
profiles they have inherited from the past, and regional legislative efforts
can not be considered as a means of inter-regional competition for in-
vestment.
This conclusion is proved by statistics on investment allocation in the
country. In 1997, almost 80% of foreign investment in the Russian
economy was concentrated in Moscow. Gross foreign investment in
Russia in 1997 increased by 50% in comparison with the previous year,
but investments made outside of the capital declined by 1/3. The re-
gions that received these investments had both liberal and conservative
economic regimes, and featured a spectrum of investment legislation.
Domestic investments were also made in Moscow, the Moscow region
and in the oil-rich regions of Siberia.
Moscow is the strongest and most frequently-mentioned example of the
huge inter-regional asymmetries that can be found in Russia. The pro-
found concentration in Moscow of the country's investment is pro-
claimed to be a demonstration of the irrelevance of regional tax reliefs
for investment. Therefore, a more detailed review of the literature de-
voted to the investment attractiveness of Moscow is necessary. "Expert"
writes that, although it is the clear leader in total investment, Moscow
does not belong to the group of the leading 20 regions with the best
manufacturing dynamics. Therefore, Moscow's investments are di-
rected, mainly, towards services and other local demand-oriented
spheres. The city's manufacturing base is not so attractive to investors.
It seems plausible that Moscow's successful development is explained
by the specific capital city position of Moscow, enabling it to grab
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financial resources. It has resulted in the "Dutch disease" of Moscow,
aggravated by a mode of registration in the city which prohibits the free
flow of labour from other regions. From this point of view, the success
of Moscow in the attraction of investment does not look so prominent.
The latest rating of "Expert" reports an unprecedented decrease in for-
eign direct investment in Moscow — by almost four times (the reduction
of total foreign direct investment in Russia is 14%) — and its reallocation
for the benefit of regions which had not, up to this point, drawn the at-
tention of foreign investors.
There is not a single point of view in the literature on the reasons which
stimulate regional bodies to grant tax exemptions. The legislative re-
gional initiatives in this sphere can be explained both as motives aimed
at the setting up of a more favourable entrepreneurial climate and at a
strengthening of the competitive position of the region, and as an imita-
tion of the legislative activity of other authorities wishing to maintain their
positions in the legislative field. The latter is set out with political aims
rather than economic ones.
In favour of the economic motives of regional authorities is Vizhina's
analysis of the trends in the granting of tax concessions by regions
that have the most problematic situation with investment supply
(Vizhina, 1998).
Polishchuk (1998) explains the differences in the practice of granting tax
exemptions among the regions as an evolution into legislative lobbying
by regional interests, and as a tendency to capture a maximum legal
space which is still free because of the weakness of the federal centre.
Thus, there is not an obvious correlation between sub-federal legislative
initiatives and regional economic performance. This study has the aim of
revealing trends in the granting of regional taxes and estimating their
effect on investment supply in the regions.
1. HYPOTHESIS FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The main focus of the study is the estimation of the impact of the tax
reliefs granted by Russian regions for regional investments. There is no
systematic evidence that investors are attracted by the tax breaks and
concessions offered by regional authorities. There are several examples
where, under otherwise comparable conditions, regions granting tax ex-
emptions to investors outperform those which do not provide such con-
cessions. But for many regions the reaction of investors to differences
in tax regimes is weak.
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The impact of a region's legislative initiatives on the attraction of in-
vestment is obscured by other factors and, in particular, by the struc-
tures of the regional economies, the provision of public goods, confi-
dence in the regional authorities, and others. An estimation of the
contribution of sub-federal tax exemptions to the supply of investment
requires controlling these important factors in regional development.
Consequently, the development of the results of regional tax breaks in
terms of investment supply determines a system of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Sub-federal tax reliefs are essential for the inter-regional
distribution of investment in Russia. A more preferential taxation regime
will attract more investment.
The investment crisis undermines the hope of the regional authorities for
noticeable investments. Therefore, the regional authorities in Russia
sometimes do not care about the level of confidence in them amongst
investors and lose incentives to a consistent economic policy. Further-
more, they have achieved broad legislative power (Polishchuk, 1998),
which is weakly controlled by the federal centre. Firstly, the number of
sub-national legislative acts is increasing at a pace, which makes it diffi-
cult to monitor this process. Secondly, given a lack of political re-
sources, the federal administration is seeking to substitute missed sup-
port in society for an alliance with the regional authorities. As a result,
the regions face few restrictions in their law-making activities. Regional
authorities adopt documents cancelling granted concessions and guar-
antees, and violate their own laws (Polishchuk, 1999). Trust in individu-
als becomes a substitute for the lack of a stable system of law and law
enforcement.
Hypothesis 2. The lack of confidence in the regional administration
plays an essential role in investment decisions, restraining investment
into the region.
Notwithstanding the relevant role of the institutional set-ups of regional
bodies, the existing characteristics of industries are the most influential
factor in current and future regional economic performance. The re-
gional industrial structure has been formed by decades of central plan-
ning and is often inconsistent with market needs. The change of the
structure that took place during the time of economic transition was
driven by suppressed domestic demand, the collapse of the military
complex, the non-competitiveness of manufacturing industries, and an
increased reliance on international trade. Under these conditions, the
regions specialising in exportable commodities (oil, gas, and metallurgy
and chemistry products) have much better positions than those where
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the local economies are dominated by the military-industrial complex, or
by manufacturing or agriculture.
Hypothesis 3. Regions with a higher share of extraction and export-
oriented industries attract more investment (so, the investment attrac-
tiveness of these industries remains high and the inter-industrial flow
of capital maintains and seems to enforce the importance of these
industries).
Equally, where there is an industrial specialisation, the level of develop-
ment of public goods in the regions is an essential factor influencing an
investor's decision-making. The decision to invest in a particular project
under otherwise comparable regional conditions is influenced by the re-
quirements for education and communication services, and transport
and market infrastructure, which depend on the aims of the projects and
those of the investor.
Hypothesis 4. Public goods are the factors which influence investment
decisions in Russia, and a positive correlation between the level of the
development of public goods and the supply of investment is expected.
Polishchuk makes the assumption that regional legal regimes have been
customised to local economic conditions and are therefore endogenous
to regional economic structures. The creation of the institutional envi-
ronment in Russian regions reflects the economic priorities of the latter.
Their priorities are shaped by the conditions specific to particular re-
gions. Russian regions make pragmatic choices in selecting their legal
and regulatory regimes (Polishchuk, 1999). These conclusions are
in accordance with the results of other studies (Ahrend, 1999; Berkowitz
and DeJong, 1998; Lavrov and Kuznetsova, 1997; Popov, 1999).
If the regional tax regime reflects the characteristics of the regional
economy, being simultaneously an explanatory variable of the invest-
ment supply, the estimations of the latter may suffer from potential en-
dogeneity problems. So the system of hypotheses underlying the sys-
tem of equations should be extended by others regarding regional tax
exemptions.
Proof of the existence of motives aimed at the creation of more favour-
able entrepreneurial climates and at strengthening the competitive posi-
tions of the regions, within the behaviour of regional authorities was
given in Vizhina's analysis, in which she revealed the tendency to grant
tax concessions in regions which have a comparatively lower supply of
investment. This study was based on data for 14 Russian local authori-
ties between 1995–1997 (Vizhina, 1998). We would like to obtain a con-
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firmation of this conclusion across a broader regional and temporal em-
pirical base.
Hypothesis 5. Those regions that have higher estimations of invest-
ment shortages and a comparatively unfortunate combination of indus-
trial development factors and underdeveloped public goods demon-
strate a greater readiness to use legislative measures to improve the
competitive position of the region and to attract investment.
Profound differences between legal and regulatory regimes in Russian
regions co-exist with striking similarities, which are evidence of the wide
dissemination of regional laws and policies throughout the country.
Owing to the widespread crisis phenomena all over the country and the
instability of the competitive positions in many regions, tax exemptions
in one region can be considered by another regional authority as a fac-
tor undermining its competitive position and may stimulate it to adopt a
similar approach. It would also be wrong not to take into the account the
political struggle among the regional elites in the lobbying for regional
interests.
The practice of the regional granting of tax exemptions allows an as-
sumption of the dissemination of these legislative initiatives.
Hypothesis 6. The higher the number of regions that have adopted tax
exempting laws, the more rapidly diffused are these kind of laws.
Alongside the adoption of regional investment laws, the fundamentals of
its particular features are of interest. Why are there variations in the size
and period of the granting of profit and property taxes? Why are there
two approaches to the granting of tax exemptions to investors? Why do
some regions grant individual and industrial concessions?
It is natural to find more concessions being granted to investors by
authorities in more problematic regions, as investment laws operate with
a certain level and period of tax exemptions and of guarantees as pa-
rameters which should be influenced by the conditions of regional de-
velopment.
Hypothesis 7. The size and period of the granting of concessions to
investors, and the providing of additional benefits to foreign investors,
have a positive correlation with estimations of investment shortages by
regional administrations and with the diffusion of regional investment
legislation around the country.
Regional legislative efforts to attract investors take different forms in
various regions. A number of regional investment laws offer investors
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clear-cut terms of operation upon their meeting of specified conditions.
Other investment laws provide for the participation of the regional ad-
ministration in the assessment of projects and in determining the actual
level of tax exemptions.
We suppose that a regional administration reserves to itself the capacity
for greater active control via the granting of tax reliefs to investors in
situations where the concessions are not fixed in the text of the invest-
ment law but are discussed with the administration.
Hypothesis 8. A more active control of a regional administration in the
granting of tax exemptions to investors is a feature of relatively stable
regions.
Regional authorities grant tax breaks not only to investors but also to
existing firms and enterprises which are not realising investment proj-
ects. It is a well-known fact that tax pressures on businesses are high in
Russia, and many firms and enterprises can not and do not pay taxes.
Tax exemptions under such conditions are an alternative to bankruptcy.
Taking into account that, in spite of the recent attempts to make inter-
governmental fiscal relations more rule-based, budgetary constraints in
Russian regions remain soft (Polishchuk, 1998). Facing the problem of
unemployment, regional authorities prefer to provide tax exemptions in-
stead of closing firms.
Hypothesis 9. The industrial and individual tax exemptions and con-
cessions to small businesses granted by regional authorities are not
aimed at the attraction of investment, but have the purpose of support-
ing firms already operating in the region and preventing the region from
experiencing an increase in unemployment.
2. DATA
Our empirical analysis relies on the legislative database "Consultant-
Plus. The regional legislation". This legal database contains more than
250 thousand documents on 72 Russian jurisdictions and local authori-
ties for the 1992–1999 period (the most recent data is for February
1999). The period covered and the regional scope of the database de-
termine the structure of the panel on which the empirical analysis was
based. The panel was constructed over the 1992–1998 period for 72
regions (the list of the regions represented and not represented in the
database are contained in Appendix A).
The system of tax reliefs and guarantees granted to investors and to the
firms participating in investment projects is usually regulated by regional
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investment laws. The number of regional investment laws implemented
was small at the beginning of the period under consideration, but it did
increase rapidly, especially in the last two years.
Table 1. Share of regions that have introduced an investment law, percentage.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 3 4 11 22 51 79
In spite of the varying texts of such documents, it is possible to distin-
guish two approaches to the granting of tax reliefs to investors. The first
approach determines the period and the value of the tax reliefs con-
tained in the law. The second fixes the principal right of investors to the
tax reliefs in the law, but the value and period of these are determined
by the regional administration. In the latter case, the control over in-
vestment flows by the regional authorities is enhanced.
Table 2. Percentage of regional investment laws that do not fix the magnitude of
tax reliefs.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
100 50 33 13 19 24 30
Accordingly, the following variables, reflecting the presence and basic
features of the investment laws, were constructed:
• A binary variable; which takes the value "0" in the case of absence
and the value "1" in the case of the presence of the law in the
region;
• The value of profit tax relief; the variable for which takes the magni-
tude "0" if the value is not fixed in the law;
• The value of property tax relief; the variable takes the magnitude "0"
if the value is not fixed in the law;
• The period for which tax reliefs are granted; the variable for which
takes the magnitude "0" if the value is not fixed in the law;
• A binary variable; which takes the value "0" if the magnitude and pe-
riod of tax reliefs are fixed in the law and the value "1" if they are
determined by an administrative body.
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In some regions, the investment laws grant a preferential tax regime to
overseas investors, or otherwise a special law has been adopted on tax
reliefs for foreign investors. To reflect such a favourable tax legislation,
an additional variable was introduced which takes the value "1" if there
are concessions for foreign investors in comparison with domestic ones
and the value "0" in the opposite case.
Alongside the investment laws aimed at supporting enterprises in gen-
eral across the whole territory of a region, there have appeared ap-
proaches in which tax reliefs for individual firms, industries or small
businesses have been granted. In addition, special development pro-
grammes have been developed. In a number of regions, "special eco-
nomic zones" have been created in which special preferential taxation
orders have been established. Such initiatives by regional authorities
seem to have an impact on the general entrepreneurial climate of the
region. Therefore, the panel was supplemented by binary variables re-
flecting the presence or absence of regional development programmes,
individual or industrial tax reliefs, tax reliefs for small businesses and
special economic zones. The last index was supplemented by variables
of the level and period over which tax reliefs are granted in the free
zone.
Table 3. Share of regions using different incentive regimes, percentage.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Personal tax reliefs 1 3   8 17 26 26 28
Industrial tax reliefs 1 6 14 25 38 40 47
Tax reliefs to small
businesses
0 1 3 4 11 14 19
Development
programmes
0 3 13 18 26 32 36
Free economic zones 1 1 3 6 7 10 11
We agree with Polishchuk that the factor of confidence in regional leg-
islative initiatives is crucial to the investment decision. This confidence
can be undermined by the precedent of the cancellation of previously-
granted tax reliefs or other rights. In this connection, a variable was in-
cluded in the panel which takes the value "1" from the moment
of the cancellation of the tax reliefs until the end of the period under
consideration.
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Table 4. Share of regions that had cancelled tax reliefs at least once,
percentage.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
0 0 0 1 6 10 13
Besides variables reflecting the process of the granting of tax reliefs,
the panel includes fundamental variables: investments; the structure of
industrial production; the share of unprofitable firms in the region; the
incomes and expenditures of the regional budget; the average level of
the profitability of production in the region; the volume of production in
the region; the development of public goods; etc. (the list of all variables
is contained in Appendix B). The indices listed above are taken from the
Goskomstat Statistical Yearbook "Regions of Russia".
In accordance with the formulated hypotheses, an important character-
istic determining the granting of tax concessions at the sub-federal level
is the regional administrations' estimation of the lack of investment in
their region. An estimation of this parameter is the difference between
demand for and supply of investment. The demand for investment
should be considered in terms of the investment projects in the current
year which have received the support of the regional administration, but
not as the demand for investment under the satisfaction of all the po-
tential needs of the regions, which is an infinitely large value.
We have obtained information on the investment projects for 1997 of
regions, republics and the autonomous areas of Siberia, and of the
Novgorod region, in all for 19 territories. The descriptive statistics re-
garding the total demand for investment and the structure of the in-
vestment projects are presented in Appendix C. In spite of the small
geographical scope of our sample, it involves authorities having different
status, different industrial specialisations and a different scale, reflected
in the size of the demand for investments and in the industrial structure
of investment projects. This variety provides the ground to use the given
group of regions for the approximation of demand for investments in
other regions.
The task is to construct a function of the demand for investment using
the parameters of regional development that are known for all regions
on the panel. An assumption was made that the factors determining the
demand for investments are: 1) accumulated fixed capital, demanding
resources for maintenance (positive correlation); 2) the level of unem-
ployment, stimulating the creation of new jobs (positive correlation);
and 3) the number of firms, reflecting the level of demand for
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investment (positive correlation). The testing of this assumption was
carried out on the sample. In this case, not only the confirmation of a
statistical significance of the listed factors, but also the obtaining of a
high value of the coefficient of determination, were held important. This
is essential for obtaining the most exact approximation of the unob-
served values in the demand for investments in regions not represented
in the sample in 1997, and for all regions in other years.
The estimated equation is as follows:
Inv_Demandi = α0 + α1FCi + α2UNEMPi + α3NENTi + εI .
Here:
Inv_Demandi — total demand for investments in region i;
FCi — fixed capital in region i;
UNEMPi — number of unemployed in region i;
NENTi — number of enterprises in region i.
The results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Estimation of the demand for investment.
Coefficient P > |t|
Fixed capital    1.56 0.001
Number of unemployed 167.26 0.046
Number of enterprises    0.36 0.007
R2 0.92
3. ESTIMATION METHODS
The investment attractiveness of a region depends on a combination of
the whole package of regional factors, including some specific features,
for instance the reputation of the regional authority in the eyes of in-
vestors, as well as the environmental, political and crime-related risks.
The panel structure of the data allows us to take into account specific
regional factors by using fixed and random effect models. In the fixed
effect model, the set of the specific regional characteristics is consid-
ered as a parameter to be constant over time and specific to each re-
gion. In the random effect model, the specific regional features were re-
flected by a random disturbance, which is constant over time and with
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zero conditional expectation. More adequate for our analysis is the fixed
effect model, under which the constant component can be treated as a
level of the investment activity in a region.
The system of the previously-formulated hypotheses within the empirical
analysis has formed a system of equations which are connected directly
through variables or which have correlated errors.
The first four hypotheses are connected with the properties of the func-
tion of the supply of investment; to test these hypotheses, the following
equation was estimated:
Sh_Invit = a0 + a1Lawit + a2Ptit + a3RStit + a4Pdit + a5Admit +
+ a6Trmit + a7Zit + a8Frnit + a9Prgit + a10Lit + a11Pinit + a12RLit +
+ a13RDit + a14PHit + a15SRVit + a16SCNit + γi + εit , (1)
Here:
Sh_Invit — share of region i in the total amount of non-budgetary in-
vestments in fixed capital in year t;
Lawit — availability (1) or absence (0) of an investment law in region i in
year t;
Ptit — profit tax relief fixed under the investment law in region i in year t;
RStit — property tax relief fixed under the investment law in region i in
year t;
Pdit — the period on which tax reliefs under the investment law in region
i in year t are granted;
Admit — a variable possessing the value "1" if the tax reliefs are not
captured in the law but are determined by the regional administration,
and "0" in all other cases;
Trmit — a variable possessing the value "1" from the moment of the
adoption of a document concerning the cancellation of tax reliefs in re-
gion i, and "0" in all other cases;
Zit — existence (1) or absence (0) of free economic zones in region i in
year t;
Frnit — existence (1) or absence (0) of a more preferential tax regime or
of an investment law aimed at foreign investors in region i in year t;
Prgit — existence (1) or absence (0) of development programmes in re-
gion i in year t;
Lit — share of unprofitable firms in region i in year t;
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Pinit — share of production of the fuel industry, metallurgy, timber and
the petrochemical industries in total industrial production in region i in
year t;
RLit — density of railway tracks in general use in region i in year t;
RDit — density of roads in region i in year t;
PHit — the proportion of the urban population with telephones in region i
in year t;
SRVit — level of services per capita in region i in year t compared with
the average level in the country;
SCNit — the share of research staff in region i in year t;
γi — a constant reflecting the level of investment activity in region i;
εit — an error term.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 connect the process of the adoption of the invest-
ment law with the characteristics of regional development; their testing
was implemented by the equation:
Lawit = b0 + b1Inv_shrit + b2Inv_indexit + b3NLawt + b4Lit +
+ b5PRFTit + b6Pinit + b7Bud_defit + b8Prgit + b9RLit +
+ b10RDit + b11SRVit + b12PHit + b13UNEMPit + εit , (2)
Here:
Inv_shrit — the ratio of the difference in the demand for and supply of
investment in fixed capital to the demand for investment in fixed capital
in region i in year t; this parameter is an estimation of the shortage of
investment: if we assume that all good projects find investors, a reason
for the lack of investment for unrealised projects is the higher risk (eco-
nomic, criminal, environmental, social and political) — thus, the given
parameter also indirectly characterises the integral level of risk in the
region;
Inv_indexit — dynamics of the investments in fixed capital in region i in
year t;
NLawt — the number of investment laws passed by year t;
PRFTit — the profitability of industrial production in region i in year t;
Bud_defit — the actual deficit of the regional budget income in year t.
Hypotheses 7 and 8 generalise the system features of the characteris-
tics of the regional investment legislation; therefore, to test these hy-
potheses, a system of equations was estimated, each one correspond-
SUB-FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTIONS IN RUSSIA20
ing to a particular characteristic of the legislation:
Ptit = c0 + c1Inv_shrit + c2Inv_indexit + c3NLawt + c4Lit +
+ c5PRFTit + c6Pinit + c7Bud_defit + c8Prgit + c9RLit +
+ c10RDit + c11SRVit + c12PHit + εit , (3)
RSTit = d0 + d1Inv_shrit + d2Inv_indexit + d3NLawt + d4Lit +
+ d5PRFTit + d6Pinit + d7Bud_defit + d8Prgit + d9RLit +
+ d10RDit + d11SRVit + d12PHit + εit , (4)
Pdit = f0 + f1Inv_shrit + f2Inv_indexit + f3NLawt + f4Lit +
+ f5PRFTit + f6Pinit + f7Bud_defit + f8Prgit + f9RLit +
+ f10RDit + f11SRVit + f12PHit + εit , (5)
Admit = l0 + l1Inv_shrit + l2Inv_indexit + l3NLawt + l4Lit +
+ l5PRFTit + l6Pinit + l7Bud_defit + l8Prgit + l9RLit +
+ l10RDit + l11SRVit + l12PHit + l13UNEMPit + εit , (6)
Zit = t0 + t1Inv_shrit + t2Inv_indexit + t3NLawt + t4Lit +
+ t5PRFTit + t6Pinit + t7Bud_defit + t8Prgit + t9RLit +
+ t10RDit + t11SRVit + t12PHit + t13UNEMPit + t14Geoi + εit , (7)
Frnit = k0 + k1Inv_shrit + k2Inv_indexit + k3NLawt + k4Lit +
+ k5PRFTit + k6Pinit + k7Bud_defit + k8Prgit + k9RLit +
+ k10RDit + k11SRVit + k12PHit + k13UNEMPit + k14Geoit + εit , (8)
Here, Geoi is a dummy variable possessing the value (1) for frontier re-
gions and the value (0) for internal ones.
Hypothesis 9 concerns tax concessions, which do not directly effect in-
vestment, but which do influence the business climate in a region; its
testing also needs an estimation of a set of equations:
Smlit = m0 + m1Inv_shrit + m2Inv_indexit + m3NLawt + m4Lit +
+ m5PRFTit + m6Pinit + m7Bud_defit + m8Prgit + m9RLit +
+ m10RDit + m11SRVit + m12PHit + m13UNEMPit + εit , (9)
Indstit = n0 + n1Inv_shrit + n2Inv_indexit + n3NLawt + n4Lit +
+ n5PRFTit + n6Pinit + n7Bud_defit + n8Prgit + n9RLit +
+ n10RDit + n11SRVit + n12PHit + n13UNEMPit + εit , (10)
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Indvdit = v0 + v1Inv_shrit + v2Inv_indexit + v3NLawt + v4Lit +
+ v5PRFTit + v6Pinit + v7Bud_defit + v8Prgit + v9RLit +
+ v10RDit + v11SRVit + v12PHit + v13UNEMPit + εit , (11)
Here:
Smlit — availability (1) or absence (0) of tax reliefs to small businesses in
region i in year t;
Indstit — availability (1) or absence (0) of industrial tax reliefs in region i
in year t;
Indvdit — availability (1) or absence (0) of tax reliefs for particular enter-
prises in region i in year t.
Thus, the system consists of 11 equations. To estimate the system, a
two-stage least squares method was applied. To test assumptions about
the probability distribution of the error terms, the Durbin–Watson test,
White's general heteroscedasticity test and the Jarque–Bera test of
normality were used.
Unlike the Goldfeld–Quandt test of heteroscedasticity, which requires a
re-ordering of the observations with respect to an independent variable
(which is difficult for our sample) or the Breisch–Pegan–Godfrey test,
which is sensitive to the assumption of normality, the general test of
heteroscedasticity proposed by White does not rely on such an as-
sumption of normality. The Jarque–Bera test of normality is an asymp-
totic large-sample test. These properties of White's and Jarque–Bera's
tests explain the application of them in our estimations.
The obtained statistics of the tests for the system of equations allow the
conclusion that probability assumptions about error terms are valid.
The Durbin–Watson statistic belongs to the intervals where the hypothe-
sis of autocorrelation is not accepted. The statistics of White's and
Jarque–Bera's tests belong to the critical regions of χ2 distributions and
the hypothesis of homoscedasticity and normality are not rejected.
4. RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATIONS AND THEIR ANALYSIS
The results of the estimation of the first equation in the system are
shown in Table 6.
The regression estimations for the equation show that there is a general
positive correlation between investment supply and regional investment
legislation. Adoption of the investment law is positive and a significant
factor in investment attraction. But less significant for investors are the
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levels of profit tax and property tax reliefs and the way the tax conces-
sions are granted (i.e. fixed in the law or up for discussion with the re-
gional administration). Obviously more important for investors are dem-
onstrations of policy support for investors and the readiness of regional
bodies to provide guarantees to investors.
Table 6. Factors influencing investment supply in the regions.
Variables ai P > |t|
Investment law 0.181 0.031
Profit tax reliefs 0.453 0.074
Property tax reliefs 0.181 0.065
Period of the granting of tax reliefs 0.382 0.174
Administrative way of determining
the value of tax reliefs
0.029 0.575
Cancellation of tax reliefs –0.121 0.049
Free economic zones 0.026 0.800
Concessions to foreign investors 0.101 0.155
Development programmes 0.036 0.218
Share of unprofitable enterprises –0.011 0.003
Share of "stable" industries 0.008 0.011
Density of railway tracks –0.001 0.320
Density of roads 0.003 0.046
Provision of telephones 0.014 0.053
Development of services 0.180 0.028
Research staff 0.025 0.030
R2 0.49
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.01
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2 ≥ z) 0.28
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2 ≥ z) 0.13
The absence of a statistically significant dependence between invest-
ment supply and concessions to foreign investors accord with this
statement. The effect of concessions to foreign investors may be lost in
the dynamics of total investment because of their small and reduced
share. According to Kravchenko (1997), the share of foreign direct in-
vestment in 1992–1997 was approximately 2% of the total amount.
Statistically significant and negative is the cancellation of tax reliefs,
which confirms the hypothesis about the important role of confidence in
regional authorities. The effect of the revoking of tax concessions does
4. RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATIONS AND THEIR ANALYSIS 23
not exceed the effect of the adoption of an investment law, but it does
cancel it out to a large extent. The difference between the correspond-
ing coefficients, which gives an estimation of a combination of the avail-
ability of the investment law and the cancellation of concessions, is 1/3,
reflecting the effect of the law on investment supply.
Industrial specialisation, the efficiency of production and the level of de-
velopment of public goods in the region also play an essential role in in-
vestors' decision-making. Regions having a comparatively high weight of
steady industries — fuel, metallurgy, petrochemical and timber — have
greater levels of investment. The positive correlation indicates a steady
trend towards an inter-industrial overflow of capital into these industries.
A significant negative factor in the equation is the share of unprofitable
production in the region. Statistically significant and positive is the
greater part of the indices of the development of public goods in the re-
gion: the density of roads, services and research potential. The latter
results are quite natural and confirm the hypothesis about the significant
role of public goods and the industrial parameters of the regions.
The estimations of the absolute values of the contributions of industrial
characteristics and public goods to the supply of investment show that
the favourable (or unfavourable) combination of these development
factors overlaps the effect of the absence (or adoption) of the invest-
ment law. There is a wide variation between the regions concerning the
different factors of development in Russia. And it is understandable why
there is not an obvious correlation between successes in the attraction
of investment and the legislative initiatives of the regional authorities.
The estimations of the second equation in the system, testing the hy-
potheses about the factors in the adoption of the investment law, are
presented in Table 7.
The significant factors behind the adoption of an investment law are the
lack of investment in the region, the spread of investment law as a leg-
islative initiative in the country and the passing of development pro-
grammes in the region.
The estimations have confirmed the hypothesis that the greater the lack
of investment realised by the regional authorities, the greater the prob-
ability of using the legislative powers of the authorities to attract it. This
conclusion is confirmed by the statistically significant positive correlation
with development programmes in the region; the passing of the pro-
gramme demands investment and stimulates a search for ways in which
it can be attracted. A less significant factor is the dynamics of invest-
ment in the region. A decrease in regional investment under the condi-
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tions of the investment crisis in country may not be an incentive for cre-
ating a more favourable climate for investors.
Table 7. Factors in the adoption of investment laws.
Variables b P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment   0.0002 0.000
Dynamics of investments –0.003 0.059
The number of regional investment laws passed   0.023 0.000
Share of unprofitable enterprises   0.005 0.138
Share of "stable" industries –0.001 0.752
Profitability of production   0.315 0.380
Development programmes   0.141 0.039
Density of railway tracks –0.001 0.068
Density of roads   0.001 0.206
Provision of telephones   0.002 0.753
Development of services –0.104 0.337
Level of unemployment   2.104 0.371
Deficit of regional budget income   0.00005 0.403
R2 0.36
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.79
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.54
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.26
The characteristics of industrial potential, the level of development of
public goods, the rate of unemployment and the income of the regional
budget do not influence the process of the adoption of an investment
law.
The results of the estimations of the equations testing the factors of the
particular characteristics of the investment legislation are presented in
Tables 8–13.
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Table 8. Factors in the level of profit tax relief contained in the investment law.
Variables ñ P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00003 0.000
Dynamics of investment –0.00147 0.253
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.01328 0.000
Share of unprofitable enterprises 0.00021 0.941
Share of "stable" industries –0.00028 0.877
Profitability of production 0.17254 0.517
Development programmes 0.09522 0.342
Density of railway tracks –0.00038 0.391
Density of roads 0.00106 0.357
Provision of telephones –0.00066 0.873
Development of services –0.01383 0.884
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00009 0.156
R2 0.22
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.93
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.29
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.18
Table 9. Factors in the level of property tax relief contained in the investment law.
Variables d P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00003 0.000
Dynamics of investment –0.00252 0.030
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.01222 0.001
Share of unprofitable enterprises –0.00114 0.702
Share of "stable" industries 0.00058 0.744
Profitability of production 0.00303 0.993
Development programmes 0.10686 0.341
Density of railway tracks –0.00057 0.179
Density of roads 0.00158 0.162
Provision of telephones –0.00008 0.987
Development of services 0.01658 0.868
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00009 0.134
R2 0.24
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.94
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.68
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.53
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Table 10. Factors in the period of the granting of tax reliefs in the investment law.
Variables f P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00012 0.000
Dynamics of investment –0.00884 0.031
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.04926 0.000
Share of unprofitable enterprises 0.00458 0.722
Share of "stable" industries –0.00178 0.795
Profitability of production 1.30035 0.244
Development programmes 0.33438 0.375
Density of railway paths –0.00134 0.409
Density of roads 0.00441 0.266
Provision of telephones 0.00920 0.581
Development of services 0.10195 0.813
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00031 0.149
R2 0.20
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.92
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.22
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.11
Table 11. Factors in the administrative mechanics of granting tax reliefs.
Variables l P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment –0.00016 0.000
Dynamics of investment –0.00026 0.694
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.00441 0.022
Share of unprofitable enterprises –0.00223 0.168
Share of "stable" industries 0.00204 0.038
Profitability of production –0.02564 0.850
Development programmes 0.01565 0.704
Density of railway tracks –0.00052 0.196
Density of roads –0.00589 0.340
Provision of telephones –0.00308 0.070
Development of services –0.12077 0.012
Deficit in regional budget income –0.00005 0.365
Level of unemployment –0.79813 0.376
R2 0.25
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.08
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.46
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.21
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Table 12. Factors in the setting up of free economic zones.
Variables t P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00017 0.000
Dynamics of investment –0.00020 0.708
The number of regional investment laws passed –0.00180 0.219
Share of unprofitable enterprises –0.00158 0.499
Share of "stable" industries –0.00002 0.992
Profitability of production –0.36677 0.179
Development programmes 0.11106 0.044
Density of railway tracks 0.00002 0.958
Density of roads 0.00132 0.143
Provision of telephones –0.00633 0.063
Development of services 0.23208 0.055
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00012 0.365
Level of unemployment 2.104 0.286
Frontier region 0.033 0.371
R2 0.37
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.02
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.20
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.11
Table 13. Factors in the granting of additional tax concessions to foreign
investors.
Variables k P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00003 0.005
Dynamics of investment 0.00117 0.395
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.00142 0.704
Share of unprofitable enterprises 0.00934 0.143
Share of "stable" industries 0.00122 0.577
Profitability of production 0.29529 0.562
Development programmes 0.08898 0.415
Density of railway tracks –0.00034 0.519
Density of roads 0.00190 0.134
Provision of telephones –0.00856 0.138
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Continued from p. 27
Variables k P > |t|
Development of services 0.31965 0.087
Deficit in regional budget income –0.00005 0.422
Level of unemployment 0.61091 0.841
Frontier region 0.08662 0.372
R2 0.15
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.89
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.47
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.14
The obtained estimations show that the factors determining the value of
tax concessions and the period of their award in the investment law are
estimations of the lack of investment in the region and the dissemination
of this legislative initiative in the country. The greater is the demand for
investment under conditions of unrealised investment projects, and the
higher is the number of regions which have passed investment laws, the
greater are the period and level of tax reliefs fixed by the law.
Concerning property tax relief and the period of tax exemptions, the dy-
namics of investment in a region is essential, while the larger the fall in
investment, the higher the available tax reliefs and the longer their dura-
tion.
Other characteristics of regional development do not have an essential
effect on the level of concessions and the period for which they are
fixed by the investment law.
The regression estimations show that concessions to investors are less
likely to be fixed in the investment law in regions having smaller estima-
tions of the lack of investment, a more favorable industrial structure of
production, and a less well-developed service sector. There is also a
significantly positive correlation with the number of investment laws
adopted in other regions. The latter fact can be explained by the wishes
of regional administrations not to be behind the legislative activity of
other regions, so as not to lose comparative advantages, but to retain
the ability to grant tax reliefs to investors more flexibly.
The estimation of the lack of investment is the only significant factor in
additional tax concessions being granted to foreign investors. The set-
ting up of free economic zones, alongside this factor, is significant in
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the adoption of regional programmes of development. Free economic
zones can be considered as a part of the realisation of these pro-
grammes.
The results of the testing of the hypothesis about granting tax privileges
to established enterprises and small businesses are shown in
Tables 14–16.
The estimations show that activity in granting tax concessions to firms
and industries, concerning not only the extension or setting up of new
firms but also those aimed at older production facilities, has the same
trend as the investment law. The number of investment laws passed is a
positive and statistically significant factor in such concessions. The hy-
pothesis about the irrelevance of such concessions to the attraction of
investment is also confirmed. The estimations concerning the lack of in-
vestment, and its dynamics, are statistically unimportant as regards the
tax concessions to separate firms or industries which are barely able to
attract investors.
Table 14. Factors in individual tax reliefs to established enterprises.
Variable v P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00006 0.221
Dynamics of investment 0.00078 0.647
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.00733 0.032
Share of unprofitable enterprises 0.00722 0.024
Share of "stable" industries –0.00487 0.043
Profitability of production –0.46786 0.438
Development programmes 0.00466 0.942
Density of railway tracks –0.00120 0.059
Density of roads 0.00016 0.893
Provision of telephones 0.00828 0.146
Development of services –0.08871 0.346
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00004 0.314
Level of unemployment 10.4472 0.000
R2 0.19
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.03
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.26
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.15
SUB-FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTIONS IN RUSSIA30
Table 15. Factors in industrial tax reliefs.
Variable n P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00003 0.081
Dynamics of investment –0.00076 0.617
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.00928 0.007
Share of unprofitable enterprises –0.00989 0.057
Share of "stable" industries –0.00496 0.048
Profitability of production –0.67061 0.109
Development programmes 0.17800 0.039
Density of railway tracks –0.00060 0.348
Density of roads –0.00119 0.323
Provision of telephones 0.00323 0.503
Development of services –0.18298 0.207
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00010 0.169
Level of unemployment 1.99893 0.534
R2 0.23
Durbin–Watson statistic 2.04
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.19
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.11
Table 16. Factors in tax reliefs to small businesses.
Variable m P > |t|
Estimation of the lack of investment 0.00016 0.168
Dynamics of investment –0.00061 0.641
The number of regional investment laws passed 0.00278 0.238
Share of unprofitable enterprises 0.00130 0.612
Share of "stable" industries 0.17097 0.238
Profitability of production 0.17096 0.565
Development programmes 0.10432 0.027
Density of railway tracks –0.00014 0.663
Density of roads 0.00088 0.378
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Continued from p. 30
Variable m P > |t|
Provision of telephones –0.00229 0.617
Development of services 0.07582 0.303
Deficit in regional budget income 0.00002 0.438
Level of unemployment 3.21017 0.041
R2 0.17
Durbin–Watson statistic 1.98
White's general heteroscedasticity test: P(χ2≥z) 0.31
Jarque–Bera test of normality: P(χ2≥z) 0.10
Both individual and industrial tax concessions are more actively used in
regions with unfavourable levels of industrial specialisation. Quite natural
is the positive significant correlation between individual tax reliefs and
the share of unprofitable firms in the region. The essential factor in con-
cessions to separate firms is the high level of unemployment. Tax con-
cessions to firms have the purpose of preventing the bankruptcy of
those firms and to lessen the growth of unemployment.
The estimations of the regression make it possible to assume that
industrial tax concessions are a part of the programmes of regional
development approved by the regional authorities; there is a positive
and significant dependence between these variables in the regression
analysis.
Industrial and individual tax concessions do not depend on the level of
the provision of public goods and on the income of the regional budget.
The point is that granting concessions to unprofitable firms is scarcely
likely either to improve or to worsen the regional budget as these grants
are inexpensive.
The granting of concessions to small businesses significantly correlates
only with the rate of unemployment and development programmes in
the region. These can be considered as a part of regional programmes
aimed at a decrease in unemployment and improving social stability in
the region. These concessions are not connected with deficits in the re-
gional budget; with the provision of the infrastructure of public goods
and the attraction of external investment, capital costs in this field of
business are comparatively low.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical estimations have confirmed that, alongside the influence
of the characteristics of industrial potential and the level of the provision
of public goods, regional investment legislation has an essential effect
on the supply of investment. More important for investors is not the
value or the period in which tax concessions are granted but the fact of
the adoption of the investment law, which demonstrates the readiness of
regional administrations to support investors and the possibility of offer-
ing them guarantees. The significant role of the reputation of the re-
gional authorities and of confidence in their decisions, in particular in
the adopted laws, is in accord with this conclusion.
The positive effect of regional investment legislation may be overtaken
by a combination of unfavourable factors, including industrial specialisa-
tion and an insufficient level of development of public goods, as well as
an absence of laws due to a disadvantageous starting position of the
region, although this does not mean a loss of investment attractiveness.
The estimations of the empirical analysis show that legislative initiatives
at the sub-federal level can compensate for some unfavourable factors
in regional development, but they are not capable of being the only
source of that development.
Those regional authorities having higher estimations of the lack of in-
vestment are more active in the adoption of investment legislation. In-
vestment laws are considered as decreasing risks and creating a more
favourable climate for business.
The diffusion in the practice of passing sub-federal investment laws has
a tendency to increase the number of tax reliefs, as well as their period
and flexibility. Regional authorities not only demonstrate support and
guarantees for investors but also provide larger concessions. So we see
not a simple imitation of legislative activity but its development. This is
connected with the wish to maintain the comparative competitive posi-
tion of the region and with the adaptation of the successful tax experi-
ments of other regions.
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APPENDICES
A. Regions in the legislative database "Consultant Plus:
the regional legislation"
Presented in the database
Not presented
in the database
Republic Kareliya, Republic of Komi,
Arkhangelsk oblast', Nenestkie AO,
Vologda oblast', Murmansk oblast', St.-Petersburg,
Leningrad oblast', Novgorod oblast', Pskov oblast',
Bryansk oblast', Ivanovo oblast', Kaluga oblast',
Kostroma oblast', Moscow, Moscow oblast',
Oryol oblast', Ryazan oblast', Smolensk oblast',
Tver oblast', Tula oblast', Yaroslavl oblast',
Republic Marie-el, Republic Mordovia,
Republic Chuvashiya, Kirov oblast',
Nizhny Novgorod oblast', Belgorod oblast',
Voronezh oblast', Kursk oblast', Lipetsk oblast',
Tambov oblast', Republic Kalmykia,
Republic Tatarstan, Astrakhan oblast',
Volgograd oblast', Penza oblast', Samara oblast',
Saratov oblast', Ulyanovsk oblast',
Republic Adiegeya, Republic Dagestan,
Republic Kabardino-Balkariya, Krasnodar kraiy,
Stavropol kraiy, Rostov oblast',
Republic Bashkortostan, Republic Udmurtiya,
Kurgan oblast', Orenburg oblast', Perm oblast',
Sverdlovsk oblast', Chelyabinsk oblast',
Republic "Altai", Altay kraiy, Kemerovo oblast',
Novosibirsk oblast', Omsk oblast',
Tomsk oblast', Tyumen oblast',
Khanti–Manseiskei AO, Republic Buryatiya,
Republic Khakasiya, Krasnoyarsk kraiy,
Irkutsk oblast', Chita oblast', Republic Yakutia,
Primorye kraiy, Khabarovsk kraiy, Amur oblast',
Sakhalin oblast', Kaliningrad oblast'.
Vladimir oblast',
Republic Ingushetia,
Kapachaevo-Cherkesiay,
Severnaya Ossetia,
Komi-Permyaztkei AO,
Iamalo-Nenestkie AO,
Taimirskie AO,
Evenkeiskie AO,
Ust'-Ordinskie AO,
Aginskie Buryatskie AO,
Evreiskie AO,
Chukotskie AO,
Kamchatka oblast',
Koryakskie AO,
Magadan oblast',
Republic Tuva.
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Â. Panel variables
Variable Variable
Existence of an investment law
Profit tax relief fixed in the law
Property tax relief fixed in the law
Period over which the reliefs are
granted
Variable reflecting a version of the law
in which tax reliefs are determined by
the regional administration
Individual tax exemptions
Industrial tax exemptions
Existence of free economic zones
Tax concessions in the free economic
zones
Period over which concessions are
granted in the free economic zones
Special concessions for foreign
investors
Tax exemptions for small businesses
Variable reflecting the cancellation of
tax concessions
Development programmes in the
region
Investment in fixed capital
Share of investments at the expense
of the budgetary funds
Indices of the growth of real
investment
Share of unprofitable firms in region
Share of unprofitable firms in the
industry Average profit in industry
Industrial product
Indices of production growth in
industry
Expenditures of the regional budget
Incomes of the regional budget
Industrial structure of production
(share of electric power industry, fuel,
timber, light, food-processing
industry, ferrous and non-ferrous
metals, engineering, construction
materials industry)
Gross regional product
Fixed capital
Population of the region
Total number of unemployed
Density of railway tracks in general
use
Density of roads
Provision of telephones for the urban
population
Services to the population
Price index in services
Number of firms
Research staff
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C. The characteristics of investment projects in the regions
Table C.1. Total demand for investment and the number of investment projects.
Region Number of projects Investments (billion rub.)
Tumen oblast' 53 55.49
Iamalo-Nenestkie AO 29 30.01
Khanti–Manseiskei AO 30 15.99
Tomsk oblast' 46 43.88
Omsk oblast' 70 26.09
Novosibirsk oblast' 107 26.26
Kemerovo oblast' 48 61.62
Altay kraiy 74 25.45
Republic "Altai" 38 12.45
Krasnoyarsk kraiy 213 122.24
Republic Khakasiya 46 11.53
Evenkeiskei AO 13 18.38
Republic Tuva 22 2.99
Irkutsk oblast' 123 66.90
Ust-Ordinskei AO 15 0.38
Republic Buryatiya 55 20.21
Chita oblast' 29 30.90
Aginskei Buryatskei AO 3 0.44
Novgorod oblast' 29 7.78
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Table C.2. Distribution of investment projects by demand for investment.
Region
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Tumen oblast' 1 9 27 12 4 0
Iamalo-Nenestkie AO 1 2 4 14 8 0
Khanti–Manseiskei AO 0 6 8 12 4 0
Tomsk oblast' 1 6 15 18 5 1
Omsk oblast' 0 10 13 30 11 6
Novosibirsk oblast' 0 4 28 39 27 8
Kemerovo oblast' 1 4 14 21 5 3
Altay kraiy 1 2 14 21 34 2
Republic "Altai" 0 1 8 13 9 7
Krasnoyarsk kraiy 2 7 56 84 51 11
Republic Khakasiya 0 2 14 23 7 0
Evenkeiskei AO 0 5 3 3 2 0
Republic Tuva 0 0 6 6 6 4
Irkutsk oblast' 0 16 38 53 15 0
Ust-Ordinskei AO 0 0 2 4 9 0
Republic Buryatiya 0 4 24 22 4 1
Chita oblast' 0 12 11 6 0 0
Aginskei Buryatskei AO 0 0 1 2 0 0
Novgorod oblast' 0 1 5 5 18
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Table C.3. Distribution of investment projects by industry sector.
Region
P
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 f
u
e
l
M
e
ta
llu
rg
y
C
h
e
m
ic
a
l
E
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
T
im
b
e
r 
a
n
d
 w
o
o
d
C
o
n
st
ru
c
ti
o
n
 m
a
te
ri
a
ls
C
o
n
su
m
e
r 
g
o
o
d
s
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
O
th
e
r
Tumen oblast' 11 0 12 7 6 0 2 3 12
Iamalo-Nenestkie AO 1 2 0 0 1 0 9 10 6
Khanti–Manseiskei AO 7 0 1 5 0 0 6 1 0
Tomsk oblast' 14 4 1 5 0 0 6 1 15
Omsk oblast' 8 0 7 33 0 3 6 2 11
Novosibirsk oblast' 18 3 8 35 1 7 11 8 16
Kemerovo oblast' 7 8 10 15 1 1 3 1 2
Altay kraiy 14 1 13 10 0 0 31 0 5
Republic "Altai" 14 3 0 1 0 0 8 2 10
Krasnoyarsk kraiy 13 20 29 69 36 9 6 9 22
Republic Khakasiya 18 8 0 2 4 2 4 0 8
Evenkeiskei AO 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Republic Tuva 7 2 1 1 1 1 4 3 2
Irkutsk oblast' 20 10 9 13 3 1 16 7 44
Ust-Ordinskei AO 1 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 6
Republic Buryatiya 3 5 0 6 3 2 2 5 29
Chita oblast' 3 14 1 0 0 0 1 7 3
Aginskei Buryatskei AO 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Novgorod oblast' 2 0 3 18 0 2 2 2 0
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